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This article examines the impact of import competition from low-wage countries (LWCs) on 
wages and wage inequality in the U.S. over the period 1972-2006. During the 1990s, studies 
appeared to settle this issue, finding that technology, not trade, accounted for the bulk of rising 
inequality. This paper revisits the link between trade and wages, motivated by two changes in the 
structure of trade. First, trade today is shaped as much by the exchange of components and tasks 
as finished goods. Second, import volumes from LWCs into advanced economies like the U.S. 
have risen dramatically since the early 1990s. The paper pays special attention to the timing of 
trade impacts. Consistent with prior work, it shows that technological change is the primary 
driver of inequality before 1990. However, after 1990 wage inequality growth is chiefly a 
function of rising import competition from low-wage economies. To account for the growing 
fragmentation of production within economic sectors, we explore trade impacts using a panel 
model where the focus in on within- rather than between-industry shifts in inequality. Lags of 
key variables are used as instruments, and our results appear robust to broad concerns with 










Since the late-1970s wage inequality, defined here as the wages of skilled workers relative to the 
wages of unskilled workers, has risen sharply in the United States. Several factors have been 
offered to explain the growing wage gap including industrial restructuring and the decline of 
unions (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Thurow, 1984); immigration (Borjas et al., 1992); the 
introduction of computers and related technology into the workforce (Haskell and Slaughter, 
1998); and international trade. Following the work of Levy and Murnane (1992) and Borjas et al. 
(1992), attention converged rapidly on the relative roles of skill-biased technological change and 
trade as the main suspects. Early efforts to explain the growth of inequality with rising import 
competition found little support (Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Richardson, 1995). Skill-biased 
technological change was left as the primary determinant of growing wage inequality through the 
1980s (Haskell and Slaughter, 1998). 
 Over the last few years there have been repeated calls to re-examine the trade-wage 
inequality relationship (Blinder, 2006; Bivens, 2007; Krugman, 2008). These calls are motivated 
by two broad concerns. First, the structure of trade has been transformed from a situation 
dominated by the exchange of finished goods, to one in which countries produce and trade 
components, tasks or activities variously bundled along international supply chains (Gereffi, 
1994; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Coe et al., 2004; Baldwin, 2006; Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2006, 2008). Second, the volume of trade involving low-wage economies, especially 
China, has risen dramatically, especially since the early-1990s. The first of these factors suggests 
that the early attempts to link trade and inequality in cross-sectional models were looking in the 
wrong place: rather than examining reallocation of resources from “low tech” to “high tech” 
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sectors, they should have been analyzing changes in the structure of production within industries 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 2001; Helpman et al., 2010). The second concern demands that we 
separate the influence of trade with low-wage economies from the impacts of trade overall 
(Bernard et al., 2006; Autor et al., 2011). 
We respond to these concerns in this paper, focusing on U.S. import competition from 
low-wage countries (LWCs) and its impact on wages and wage inequality. We pay special 
attention to the timing of trade impacts, showing that before 1990 technological change was 
more important to the growth of wage inequality than was trade with LWCs. In part, this is due 
to the relatively small volume of LWC imports into the U.S. at this time. Post-1990, import 
competition from low-wage economies has a positive and significant impact on wage inequality, 
while the influence of technological change is negligible. To account for the growing 
fragmentation of production within economic sectors, we explore these impacts using a panel 
model that focuses attention on shifts in wage inequality within industries rather than between 
them. Lags of key variables are used as instruments, and our results appear robust to broad 
concerns with endogeneity and to different measures of technological change. 
The paper is organized in four sections that follow. Section 2 provides some background 
information on shifts in U.S. import competition and past research linking trade and wage 
inequality. In Section 3, we outline data sources and our general model specification. Results are 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the main findings. 
 
2. Background 
As in most countries around the world, trade is becoming increasingly important to the U.S. 
economy. From 1972 to 2007, imports as a share of U.S. GDP climbed from 5.3% to 
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approximately 15.5%. Over this same period the share of imports to the U.S. originating in low-
wage countries1 has grown faster still, with most of this growth concentrated in the period since 
1990. Figure 1 illustrates the growth of manufactured imports to the U.S. from these low-wage 
economies, and from the rest of the world in total.2 We focus on manufactured imports 
throughout this paper because of the lack of production data for other parts of the U.S. economy.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The value of total U.S. manufactured imports expanded from $185 billion in 1972 to 
$1280 billion by 2006 (in constant, year-2000 dollars). As Figure 1 shows, the share of U.S. 
manufactured imports originating in low-wage countries has increased, especially since the end 
of the 1980s. Indeed, between 1972 and 2006, LWC manufactured imports to the United States 
increased at an annual average compound growth rate of 10.6%, compared with a growth rate of 
5.7% for manufactured imports in total. In 1972, the LWC share of total manufactured imports to 
the U.S. stood at 7.5%. This share increased to 15.9% in 1990 and to 40.4% in 2006. 
 
[FIGURE 2A ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
In the United States, the last few decades have been marked by a dramatic swing in the 
geographic origin of imports, a remapping of trade, at least in relative terms, away from other 
advanced industrialized countries towards lower and middle income developing nations. Figures 
2a and 2b illustrate these shifts, highlighting the sources of U.S. imports from low-wage 
                                                
1 Low-wage countries are identified using World Bank data for the year 1988, the mid-point of our period of 
investigation. Low-wage economies comprise those countries the World Bank defines as low income and lower-
middle income. 
2 Manufactured imports accounted for approximately 83% of all U.S. imports in 2006. 
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countries and from industrialized nations (medium- and high-wage countries), and revealing how 
the volume of trade flows from different regions has changed over time.  
Figure 2a shows the rapid growth of U.S. imports from Mexico and LWCs in the East 
Asia and Pacific region over the last few decades. In 1972, these two regions combined 
accounted for 51% of U.S. imports from developing economies. By 2006, the LWC import share 
of these two regions was 87%. Figure 2b shows the origins of U.S. imports from industrialized 
nations. The shares of world regions in non-LWC exports to the United States have remained 
relatively stable, dominated by flows from Europe and Central Asia, from the East Asia and 
Pacific region, and from Canada. Between 1972 and 1990, the East Asia and Pacific region 
recorded the largest growth in exports to the United States, while European and Central Asian 
exports to the U.S. grew most rapidly after 1990. 
 
[FIGURE 2B ABOUT HERE] 
 
China alone is responsible for 30% of the growth in U.S. manufactured imports since 
1990 (and thereby, a large portion of the increase in LWC imports from the East Asia and Pacific 
region in Figure 2a). The marked rise in imported manufactured goods from China, not only by 
the United States but a broad range of economies, has prompted examination of the nature of 
these products.  Particular attention has been focused on their level of technological 
sophistication, and potential labor market impacts across developed economies (Rodrik, 2006; 
Koopman et al., 2008; Schott, 2008). Of the labor market impacts of trade, wage inequality has 
received by far the most attention (Collins, 1992; Kletzer, 2002; Klein et al., 2003; Davidson and 
Matusz, 2004; Greenaway et al., 2008; Elsby et al. 2013). Figure 3 shows the growth of wage 
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inequality within the U.S. manufacturing sector beginning in the early 1970s. This measure of 
wage inequality is based on the ratio of the average annual wage of non-production workers to 
the average annual wage of production workers in manufacturing. It has become common in the 
literature linking trade to wages within the manufacturing sector to use non-production workers 
as a proxy for skilled workers and to use production workers as a proxy for unskilled workers. 
From Figure 3, it is clear that wage inequality declined through the 1970s, and then it increased 
sharply from 1982 through 2000. On average, wages paid to non-production (skilled) workers in 
manufacturing in 1982 were 1.52 times larger than wages paid to production (unskilled) workers. 
By 2000 that skilled-unskilled wage ratio in manufacturing had expanded to 1.78, an increase of 
more than 17%, since which time it has moderately declined. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 In the early 1990s, a number of authors sought explanations for the steep rise in U.S. 
wage inequality that marked the preceding decade (Borjas et al., 1992; Lawrence and Slaughter, 
1993). Attention quickly moved to demand-side arguments (Katz and Murphy, 1992), with trade 
and skill-biased technological change seen as most culpable. Empirical analysis of trade impacts 
was predominantly cross-sectional in nature, with researchers exploiting sectoral variation in 
import competition, relative commodity prices and wages, informed by the factor content of 
imports and the claims of Stolper-Samuelson (Freeman and Katz, 1991; Sachs and Schatz, 1994, 
Baldwin and Cain, 2000) At the time, researchers generally agreed that skill-biased technological 
change played the largest role in shaping inequality, since the volume of U.S. imports, and 
especially those from low-wage economies, was regarded as too small to support the observed 
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shifts in relative wages (Krugman, 2000). Some push these same arguments today (Edwards and 
Lawrence 2013); others were not convinced even in the 1990s (Leamer, 1998). 
In searching for a more robust link between trade and wages, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 
2001) offered early evidence of the importance of intermediates rather than finished goods in 
aggregate trade flows and provided a simple model of production in a single industry with two 
inputs, one unskilled labor intensive and the other skilled labor intensive. Production of the 
unskilled labor intensive input was set as footloose, located domestically or imported 
(outsourced), with the share of imports set by the global price of the unskilled labor intensive 
input relative to its domestic price. In this fashion, Feenstra and Hanson (2001) re-direct factor 
proportions arguments away from between sector adjustments to within sector adjustments and 
they report that within U.S. industries the effect of outsourcing on the skilled-unskilled wage 
premium is of the same form and magnitude as skill-biased technological change. 
It is clear from Feenstra and Hanson (2001) that the failure of past studies to reveal a 
strong relationship between trade and wages may not point to an absent relationship as much as 
to an outdated conception of global trade (Feenstra, 2008; Krugman, 2008). All trade models 
implicitly assume that reductions in international trade costs, a combination of tariffs, 
transportation, and other costs of transacting across distance, have rendered sensible the spatial 
separation of producers and consumers. But what if recent declines in trade costs, due to fiber-
optics networks more than cheap shipping, have now enabled the widespread separation of 
individual tasks within sectors of the economy? Though difficult to accurately measure, existing 
data suggest that trade in intermediates and tasks, variously described as task trade, 
fragmentation, offshoring, outsourcing, or vertical specialization, appears to be quantitatively 
significant and rapidly growing (Blinder, 2006; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Baldwin, 
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2006; Venables, 2009). Fully 50% of the rapid growth in merchandise trade between 1962 and 
1999 can be attributed to national specialization in subsets of manufacturing production (Yi, 
2003). Moreover, the import share of total inputs into U.S. manufacturing more than doubled 
between 1972 and 2000 (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Imports of ‘Other Private 
Services,’ a category that includes business and professional services, have grown five-fold since 
1992 (Bureau of Economic Affairs, 2009). This new spatial separation between subsets of 
manufacturing and service activities suggests that the locus of comparative/competitive 
advantage is shifting from industries and finished goods to more fine-grained tasks. If this is 
indeed the case, estimates of the impacts of trade on labor markets must look to changes within 
industries, rather than seeking trade effects in the shift of resources between industrial sectors. 
 Evidence of shifts in the structure of advanced economies from an emphasis on routine to 
non-routine tasks is provided by Autor et al. (2003), Spitz-Oener  (2006) and Goos and Manning 
(2007). Although task-biased technological change is typically imagined as the source of these 
shifts, the effect of trade, particularly with developing countries, could conceivably push in the 
same direction. Ebenstein et al. (2009) explore this idea showing that domestic workers 
performing non-routine tasks in U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs) find their wages less 
strongly affected by trade with subsidiaries in developing economies than workers that perform 
routine tasks. Similarly, Becker et al. (2008) use micro-data for workers and trade in German 
MNEs to show that the ratio of non-routine to routine workers in these firms increases with 
related-party trade with developing economies. Kemeny and Rigby (2012) combine trade, 
industry, and occupation-task data for U.S. industries to explore the growth of non-routine work 
in the U.S. economy since the early 1970s. They report a significant, positive relationship 
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between trade with low-wage economies and non-routine job growth within U.S. manufacturing 
industries.  
 Though the connection between international trade and inequality historically has focused 
on imports, growing evidence of firm heterogeneity and trade, particularly the characteristics of 
exporters, links the rise of exports and wage inequality both within the firm and at the industry 
level (Bernard and Jensen 1999; Bernard et al. 2007; Castellani et al. 2010; Klein et al. 2010). 
While most such work focuses on developed economies, similar findings are offered for 
developing countries where there has been considerable skill-upgrading within export-oriented 
firms (Zhu and Trefler 2005; Bustos 2007; Verhoogen 2008). Indeed, there is growing evidence 
within low-wage countries, more generally, that increased trade is correlated with rising 
inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). The import and export literature is linked by Bas and 
Strauss-Kahn (2010) who show that increased variety in imports may lead to firm-level 
productivity gains that encourage exports. Bas (2012) further examines the interaction of exports 
and technology choice within heterogeneous firms that lead to shifts in the relative demand for 
skilled labor.  Wagner (2012) provides a comprehensive recent review of the trade and firm 
performance literature consistent with the idea of firm heterogeneity. 
 What about the timing of the shifts noted above and the relative roles of technological 
change and trade with low-wage countries in driving the growth of wage inequality within the 
United States? It is important to note that relatively few papers have examined the recent, post-
1990, contribution of technological change and trade on relative wages within the United States. 
Krugman (2008) concurs, noting that the empirical research linking trade and wages is largely 
outdated. In the few notable exceptions, Sitchinava (2008) extends the capital-goods trade 
estimates of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) reporting mixed evidence of trade and skill-biased 
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technological change impacts for cross-sectional (between) industry models estimated over the 
periods 1989-1996 and 1997-2004. Ebenstein et al. (2009) examine the period 1982-2002 and 
show that the impact of offshoring on the U.S. labor market depends on the location of offshore 
activities, with low-wage offshoring reducing employment and wages particularly in the 1990s. 
They also reveal that import competition drives employment reallocation between industries with 
largely negative wage effects for the workers involved. For the services sector, Liu and Trefler 
(2008) report relatively small U.S. labor market effects of services offshoring to China and India 
between 1996 and 2006. Shifting to low-wage country imports, a prominent feature of post-
1990s trade, Bernard et al. (2006) identify multiple forms of response by U.S. manufacturers 
including exit and product upgrading as well as the reallocation of activity between sectors. They 
go on to call for more research on the impacts of trade with low-wage economies. This paper is 
very much a response to that call, detailing for the first time for the United States how 
technological change and low-wage country import competition has impacted wage inequality 
for two relatively long periods, the first extending from 1972 to1990 and the second from 1990 
to 2005. 
The empirical analysis reported below is motivated by recent theoretical work on trade 
and labor market impacts. This work largely falls into one of two camps (Neary 2010), the first 
developed within a framework of perfect competition and comparative advantage extended to 
incorporate the production and trade of intermediates or tasks (Feenstra and Hanson 2001; 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008), the second resting on product differentiation and 
monopolistic competition (Melitz 2003; Yeaple 2005; Helpman et al. 2010). It is the former that 
underpins our empirical model. The crux of this theoretical work is to establish how intra-
industry trade in some segment of the production chain shifts relative demand and wages toward 
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high-skilled workers. This is conventionally achieved by allowing production to fragment across 
trading nations and by assuming that the production of intermediate inputs is intensive in their 
use of either skilled labor or unskilled labor (Ethier 2005). Feenstra and Hanson (2001) develop 
these arguments assuming that unskilled labor and imported intermediates are substitutes and 
thus a decrease in the unit price of an imported input will cause a decrease in domestic demand 
and the relative price of unskilled labor.  Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) outline a similar 
model of trade in tasks, the separable pieces of work performed in the production process. For 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) the decision to offshore tasks is dependent upon the costs 
of monitoring and controlling workers at a distance in relation to the potential benefits of lower 
wages in foreign countries. Those costs are assumed lower for routine tasks typically performed 
by low-wage workers rather than for non-routine tasks typically performed by high-wage 
workers (Autor et al. 2003). The greater tendency to offshore routine tasks is hypothesized to 
increase wage inequality. Parro (2013) extends this literature offering a general equilibrium 
model of “skill-biased trade” resting on the complementarity between capital and skilled labor 
that provides additional theoretical support for trade-inequality links in both developed and 
developing economies. Kurokawa (2011) also adds to this literature, developing a model of the 
complementarity of variety in what is available to trade with skilled labor, with tariff reductions 
increasing variety in trade and driving relative demand for skilled labor.  
 Our approach is also related to recent empirical papers motivated by these same 
theoretical developments (see Ekholm and Midelfart 2005; Ebenstein et al. 2009; Kemeny and 
Rigby 2012) and that in various ways seek to explore how the geographical fragmentation of 
production stages and tasks has affected the demand for workers of various types. Like all these 
papers, we regress the relative wages of skilled to unskilled workers within an industry on a 
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sector-specific measure of low-wage country import competition and a measure of technological 
change, with other industry characteristics as controls. We do not explicitly trace the flows of 
low-wage country intermediates throughout the U.S. economy, following Freeman and Hanson 
(2001), in part because we share some of the concerns of Houseman (2011) and Sitchinava 
(2008) on bias in this measure of offshoring, explored further by Feenstra and Jensen (2012).  
We bypass this concern showing that aggregate measures of import competition are sufficient to 
sustain the claim that imports from low-wage countries are related to increasing wage inequality 
in U.S. manufacturing. 
Thus, we add to the literature examining import competition and rising wage inequality 
within the U.S. economy through our explicit focus on imports from low-wage economies and 
through our investigation of a temporal change in the nature of the relationship between low-
wage imports and relative wages in U.S. manufacturing. We show that import competition from 
low-wage economies emerged as a significant force shaping wage inequality in the United States 
only from the late-1980s/early-1990s, precisely when U.S. imports from low-wage economies, 
particularly China, accelerated sharply. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
In order to explore the impact of low-wage imports on wage inequality within sectors of the U.S. 
economy we combine annual data on U.S. imports from low-wage countries together with 
industrial accounts available at the 4-digit (SIC) level. Our data span 459 industrial sectors and 
34 years. The trade data originate from the work of Robert Feenstra, funded by the National 
Science Foundation and National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The industry series is 
drawn from the NBER-Center for Economic Studies (CES) Manufacturing Productivity 
 14 
Database currently assembled by Bartelsman, Becker and Gray (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). 
Though this dataset offers a wealth of industry-specific information, including capital stocks, 
wages and total factor productivity, it does not provide measures of worker skills or levels of 
education. However, it does distinguish wages for production and non-production workers. As is 
customary in the literature, we classify non-production workers as skilled and production 
workers as unskilled. This permits calculation of changes in the relative wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers, our proxy for wage inequality. 
 Empirical analysis of the link between trade and wage inequality is based upon a 
relatively standard model specification (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Ebenstein et al., 2009; 
Kemeny and Rigby, 2012) 
 
 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑆,𝐾, 𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶,𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑊𝐶)       (1) 
 
where 𝑦  represents the ratio of the average wages of non-production to production workers, 𝑆   
represents shipments, 𝐾 measures capital intensity, 𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶 represents skill-biased technological 
change and 𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑊𝐶 represents trade or import competition from low-wage countries. In the 
analysis below we also examine the impacts of the independent variables on the wages of 
production workers and non-production workers separately. 
We estimate the relationship in equation (1) using data for all 4-digit (SIC) 
manufacturing industries for each year from 1972 to 2005. We relax the assumption that the 
regression function is constant across industrial sectors by allowing each industry to have its own 
constant (𝑎!) that captures industry specific characteristics that are assumed fixed over time. 𝜖 
represents an error term that we assume possesses the usual properties. This leads to the 
following econometric specification 
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 𝑦!" = 𝑎! + 𝛽!𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝐾!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑊𝐶!" + 𝜖!"    (2) 
 
where i indexes industries and t represents years. 
To focus attention on changes in these variables within industries, we adopt a panel 
specification, taking advantage of the temporal component of our data. Theory does not discount 
the probability that unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the independent variables in our 
model, thus mandating use of a fixed effects panel of the following form 
 𝑦!" − 𝑦! = 𝑎! − 𝑎! + 𝛽!(𝑆!" − 𝑆!)+ 𝛽!(𝐾!" − 𝐾!)+ 𝛽!(𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶!" − 𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶!)+   
    𝛽! 𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑊𝐶!" − 𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑊𝐶! + 𝒛𝜷+ 𝜀!" − 𝜀!   (3) 
 
where the vector z represents annual dummy variables, added after time-demeaning the other 
components of equation (3). In this case, a base-year is chosen for analysis and the coefficient 
vector (𝜷 ) on the time dummies indicates the size of individual year specific shocks to the 
economy as a whole relative to the omitted base-year dummy.  
 
Letting 𝑋!" = 𝑋!" − 𝑋!, we estimate the following equation 
 
 𝑦!" = 𝛽!𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝐾!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑊𝐶!" + 𝒛𝜷+ 𝜀!"   (4) 
 
In the analysis that follows, all continuous variables are logged and dollar denominated values 
are deflated using the sector-specific deflators available in the NBER-CES industry data. 
For each industry, trade competition from low-wage economies is defined as 
 𝑇𝐶𝐿𝑊𝐶!" = !"#$%&'  !"#$  !"#$  !"!"#$%&'(!!"!!"#$%&'!"!!"#!"#$!" 
where the import and export values in the denominator are measured across all countries that 
trade with the U.S..  This measure represents the portion of good i in year t available for 
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domestic consumption in the United States that is exported by a low-wage country. The set of 
countries comprising the LWC group includes “Low Income” or “Lower Middle Income” 
economies according to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We use World Bank 
definitions for 1988, the mid-point of our study period. Figure 4 reports values of U.S. trade 
competition from LWCs and from all trade partners. These trade competition measures are 
shown as indices with values set at 1 in 1972. The index of overall U.S. import competition 
increased by a factor of 5 since 1972, while LWC import competition increased by a factor of 24. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Lacking direct measures of skill-biased technological change (SBTC), we use total factor 
productivity (TFP) as a proxy, available for each industry in all years examined. We recognize 
that TFP is a general indicator of technological change rather than a measure of SBTC, and so as 
a robustness check we also use the computer share of total capital investment available from the 
Census of Manufactures to represent SBTC. Both these measures have been repeatedly used in 
past research as proxies for skill-biased technological change. While the computer investment 
data cover all 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries, they are available for only a few years of our 
study period. In all regressions below, we incorporate (Huber-White) robust standard errors to 
control for potential heteroscedasticity. A Hausman test further suggests use of the fixed effects 
model over the random effects alternative. 
 
4. Results 
The starting point of our analysis is a fixed effects panel model estimated using ordinary least 
squares. Our attention focuses on the partial regression coefficients linking the dependent 
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variable to import competition from low-wage countries and to skill biased technological change, 
the latter proxied by measures of total factor productivity. In general, we anticipate that LWC 
import competition will lower the relative wage of production (unskilled) workers, and that skill-
biased technological change should do the same. For all models in Table 1, results indicate that 
most of the variance in the dependent variables is explained by differences between industries. 
An F-test indicates that these industry differences are significant and thus pooled OLS is an 
inappropriate estimation strategy. 
 
4.1 Baseline Estimates 
Model 1 in Table 1 represents a base model for the period 1972-1990, capturing results that are 
broadly consistent with research from the early 1990s. As with much of the early literature, this 
model measures import competition from all countries that export to the United States, not just 
developing economies. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of wages between 
non-production (skilled) and production (unskilled) workers. Column 2 in Table 1 shows that 
only TFP, our indicator of skill-biased technological change, is significantly related to the 
change in relative wages within industries. Consistent with our theoretical priors, TFP is 
positively associated with inequality over this period. Overall import competition has no 
significant relationship with wage inequality. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In the next three models in Table 1, we turn our attention to imports from low-wage 
countries and to the full period under study, 1972-2005. Three different dependent variables are 
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examined. In Model 2, the dependent variable is the average wage of production (unskilled) 
workers. Model 3 predicts how trade and technology are related to the average wage of non-
production (skilled) workers. Model 4 measures how these key variables affect inequality, as 
measured by the ratio of the average wages of non-production to production workers. Over the 
study period as a whole, trade competition from low-wage countries exerts a significant and 
negative impact on the average wages of unskilled workers, while it has no significant influence 
on the average wage of skilled workers. Thus, the net effect of import competition from low-
wage countries is an increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. Skill-
biased technological change has no significant impact on wage inequality for the study-period 
overall, though consistent with theoretical expectations, the coefficient for TFP is larger for 
more-skilled rather than less-skilled workers. 
 
4.2 Endogeneity 
These relationships, while suggestive, ignore potential bias as a result of endogeneity. The results 
in Table 1 assume that import competition and technological change each exert an exogenous 
influence on firms and the wages that they provide. However, trade, technology and wages might 
be related in a quite different manner. Specifically, some firms might decide to offshore a subset 
of their production activities, changing domestic technology while also giving rise to increased 
trade. The potential for reverse causation in our model suggests use of instrumental variables 
techniques to examine endogeneity bias. Lacking an ideal set of exogenous variables, we use 
one-, two- and three-year lags of our right hand side variables to serve as instruments. The 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used because it produces consistent and 
efficient estimates when errors are not independent and identically distributed (iid). When the 
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estimating equation is overidentified, the GMM estimator also provides a useful set of 
diagnostics for identification tests as well as the exogeneity of instruments. Finally, using 
Newey-West estimators in conjunction with GMM techniques, we produce estimates that are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to a specified order (3 years in the analysis 
below). 
Table 2 reports results from using instrumental variables estimates within a GMM 
framework. As expected, the standard errors on most variables have been reduced. We estimate 
two models in Table 2. In Model 1, we treat all independent variables as endogenous. Using one, 
two and three period lags of all predictors as instruments, we find that rising import competition 
from low-wage countries has a positive and significant impact on wage inequality. The sign on 
the TFP variable (our measure of skill-biased technological change) is negative, running counter 
to theoretical expectation, though this variable is not significant. The diagnostics from the IV 
fixed effects panel models are sound: first-stage regressions (which we omit for brevity) pass 
underidentification and weak identification tests, and the Hansen J-statistic reveals that our 
instrument set can be considered exogenous.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Following endogeneity tests on all regressors, in our second model we treat shipments and 
capital intensity as exogenous. Our measures of skill-biased technological change and import 
competition could not be considered exogenous from these tests. Results from this second IV 
model are similar to those from Model 1: rising LWC import competition increases wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled manufacturing workers in the United States, while skill-
biased technological change has no significant influence. 
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4.3 Timing Issues: Distinct Periods for Trade Impacts? 
Given the general effects we report in Tables 1 and 2, we now investigate whether the impacts of 
trade and technology on relative wages vary across different time periods. There is some 
rationale for doing so. First, we know that skill-biased technological change ought to have been 
important during the 1980s and into the early 1990s, tracking the introduction of computing 
technology into the workplace. We also know that imports from low-wage economies, 
particularly China, began to accelerate rapidly after 1990. These temporal patterns might help 
explain why the majority of early studies (published before 1995, and mostly studying the 1980s) 
find that technology exerts a far larger influence on rising wage inequality than trade. To test this 
argument, we divide our period of investigation into two sub-periods, pre-1990 and post-1990, 
and re-estimate Equation (4) for each sub-period, using instrumental variables techniques as 
above.3  
We present the results of these estimates in Table 3. Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 present 
results from estimating Equation (4) for the initial period, 1972-1990. Our findings are similar to 
those obtained from the majority of studies that explored the effects of skill-biased technological 
change and trade on relative wages through the 1980s. In Model 1, all independent variables are 
treated as endogenous. The results show that none of the predictors exert a significant effect on 
wage inequality.  
 
                                                
3 Moving the cut date a few years either side of 1990 has little influence on the model results that are displayed in 
Table 3. We also explored shifting the threshold to 1994, on the basis that at this date the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was ratified. However, this year did not signal a large uptick in overall low-wage 
country imports; rather, the shift appears to occur right around 1990. This 1990 cut date is also used by Autor, Dorn, 
and Hanson (2011) as the start of substantial shifts in import levels from low-wage economies, in their case, 
specifically China.  
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
On further inspection, however, in this early period endogeneity tests support treating skill-
biased technological change and import competition as exogenous. This is done in model 2, 
where the results conform to existing literature: skill-biased technological change increased wage 
inequality through the 1980s, while the influence of trade from low-wage economies was 
insignificant. 
In Models 3 and 4 that track the post-1990 period, the results change considerably. Since 
the early-1990s, rising wage inequality in the United States appears to be driven largely by 
increased import competition from low-wage economies. The impact of skill-biased 
technological change on wage inequality is insignificant after 1990. Endogeneity tests for the 
post-1990 data support treatment of shipments and capital intensity variables as exogenous. 
Thus, in model 4, only technological change and import competition are estimated with 
instruments. As with the previous model, results indicate that import competition from LWCs is 
the primary driver of wage inequality in the U.S. since 1990. Skill-biased technological change 
has no significant influence on wage inequality. 
To bolster confidence in these results, we re-estimate our model using an alternative 
measure of skill-biased technological change. Though total factor productivity is widely used as 
a proxy for skill-biased technological change, it is likely an imperfect one. While the literature 
on skill-biased technological change is chiefly concerned with the dramatic and widespread 
adoption of computer technology in the workplace, rates of growth of total factor productivity 
have been relatively modest since the 1970s. To ensure that our findings are not driven by the 
imperfections of our proxy, we produce a final set of results where skill-biased technological 
change is measured as the computer share of total capital investment, using the Census of 
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Manufactures’ data on sector-specific spending on ‘computers and peripheral data processing 
equipment.’ Though appealing on a conceptual level, this variable is available for relatively few 
years. We employ it here first using just two years, 1982 and 1992, that cover the period during 
which computer investment increased most rapidly across U.S. manufacturing.4 A second model 
is run over the three years 1992, 2002 and 2005, representing the second part of our study period. 
 
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 presents the results from models in which the computer share of total capital 
investment is our measure of skill-biased technological change. Diagnostic tests for the models 
in Table 4, with a longer time-step, show that all independent variables are exogenous and so we 
run a simple fixed effect panel model, including year fixed effects. Model 1 indicates that 
increases in the computer share of investment have a significant and positive impact on wage 
inequality over the period 1982 to 1992, while the influence of trade competition from low-wage 
economies is insignificant at this time. Results from Model 2, for the period after 1992, indicate 
that the computer share of investment has no significant influence on wage inequality, while 
trade competition from the developing world has a significant positive influence on wage 
inequality. The results in Table 4 are entirely consistent with those from the work presented 




                                                
4 The Census of Manufactures is collected every five years in years ending in ‘2’ and ‘7.’ This explains why the 
results in Table 4 break the pre-/post-1990s period at 1992 rather than 1990. 
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Conclusion 
Global trade patterns have shifted dramatically since the early-1990s, with low-wage economies, 
most notably China, exporting ever larger volumes of goods and services to advanced, 
industrialized economies. These trends presage the emergence of a third trade regime following 
the East-West flows between developed economies that characterized monopolistic competition 
in the 1970s. Indeed, the growth of import competition from LWCs to the United States 
increased by a factor of 30 between 1970 and 2005, compared with a growth factor of just 5 for 
import competition from all U.S. trade partners combined. 
 Shifts in the structure of global trade flows and their influence on economies around the 
world have generated considerable alarm. An earlier round of investigation on trade impacts in 
developed economies concluded that import competition had little impact on the rapid growth of 
wage inequality in the 1980s. The primary driver of the steep rise in the relative wages of skilled 
workers over that decade appears to have been skill-biased technological change. The research 
here confirms this finding, but goes on to show that continued growth in U.S. wage inequality 
since the early-1990s is largely the result of rising import competition. Specifically, we show that 
since 1990, skill-biased technological change has played no role in the continued expansion of 
the skilled worker-unskilled worker wage gap in U.S. manufacturing. Over the last fifteen years, 
the growth of U.S. wage inequality has been driven largely by increased trade competition from 
developing countries.  
 There is little reason to expect that the growth of trade competition from developing 
economies will decline in the medium term. Though the recent global economic downturn 
temporarily depressed trading activity, there is widespread agreement that imports and offshoring 
activities are recovering and that they will continue to intensify in the future. The fact that 
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routinized and less skill-intensive economic activities are increasingly being moved to lower cost 
locations suggests that demand for “unskilled” production workers may be further depressed. 
How should we respond? The potential gains from trade are clear: increased productivity and 
lower costs for many commodities. On the one hand we all benefit from trade. On the other hand, 
the costs of trade are distributed unevenly. In general, those costs are borne disproportionally by 
countries that are unable to shift the terms of trade in their favor and by different groups of 
workers within developed and developing countries alike. Within advanced, industrialized 
economies such as the United States, less-skilled workers and those engaged in routine tasks face 
the greatest threat from globalization. Trade barriers are too blunt a policy instrument to mitigate 
the negative consequences of trade. Increased investment in education and worker retraining 
initiatives are obvious possibilities, but many of our international competitors are climbing the 
skill ladder just as surely as we are. Education alone may not prove a viable long-run hedge 
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Table 1: The Impact of Import Competition and Technology on Wage Inequality; Fixed 
Effect Panel (OLS)  
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent   Variables 



























































   
Observations 5862 11487 11486 11486 
R-squared (within) 0.0333 0.9725 0.9506 0.0783 
Notes: All variables are logged. Year fixed effects  included but not shown. All models were estimated with a 
constant. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significant at the 0.1 level, ** indicates 




Table 2: The Impact of Import Competition and Technology on Wage Inequality, 1972-
2005; Instrumental Variables Estimation (2-stage GMM) 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable:  
Wage Ratio 
 Model 1 
All independent vars. 
treated as endogenous 
Model 2 





























Observations 10055 10055 
R-squared 0.0870 0.0871 
Root MSE 0.1138 0.1138 
Underidentification Test 








   
Weak Identification Test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic) 

















Notes: All variables are logged. Year fixed effects included but not shown. * indicates significant at the 0.1 level, ** 
indicates significant at the 0.05 level, *** indicates significant at the 0.01 level. Newey-West standard errors with a 
Bartlett kernel ensure estimates are robust to arbitrary serial correlation up to order 3, and to heteroscedasticity. In 
model 1, where all independent variables were treated as endogenous, three period lags of all independent variables 
were utilized as instruments. In model 2, three period lags of TFP and Import Competition were used as instruments, 




Table 3: The Impact of Import Competition and Technology on Wage Inequality: Timing 





 1972-1990 1991-2005 
 Model 1       
All independent 
vars. treated as 
endogenous                             
Model 2 
lnS and lnK 
treated as 
endogenous                             
Model 3   
All independent 
vars. treated as 










































Observations 4526 4956 5528 5528 
R-squared 0.0372 0.0372 0.0406 0.0462 
Root MSE 0.1013 0.101 0.109 0.109 
Underidentification Test: 















     
Weak Identification Test: 





































Notes: All variables are logged. Year fixed effects included but not shown. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. * indicates significant at the 0.1 level, ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level, *** indicates significant 
at the 0.01 level. Newey-West standard errors with a Bartlett kernel ensure estimates are robust to arbitrary serial 
correlation as well as heteroscedasticity. Three period lags of all independent variables were used as instruments in 
models 1 and 3. In model 2, where TFP and Import Competition are treated as exogenous, three period lags of 
Capital Intensity and Shipments were used as instruments.  In model 4, where lnS and lnK are treated as exogenous, 






Table 4: Robustness Checks (Substituting the Computer Share of Capital Investment for 
Total Factor Productivity) 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variable: 
Wage Ratio 
 Model 1 
1982-1992 





















Observations 587 1078 
R-squared 0.0305 0.0441 
Notes: All variables are logged. Year fixed effects not shown. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * 
indicates significant at the 0.1 level, ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level, *** indicates significant at the 0.01 
level. Model 1 is estimated using data for 1982 and 1992 only. Model 2 is estimated using data for 1992, 2002 and 
2005 only. 
 
 
